ladies and gentleman, the great John Nash (from the WSJ)
Terrorists make rational decisions about the kind and timing of attacks, employing a substitution strategy. When U.S. airports installed metal detectors in 1973, for example, skyjackings fell to 16 a year from 70. But hostage-taking surged to 48 a year from 20, and assassinations to 36 a year from 20. Similarly, after U.S. embassies were fortified in 1976, attacks on American diplomatic targets fell to 20 a year from 28. But assassinations of diplomats and soldiers outside secured compounds rose to 53 a year from 20. Squeeze here, and terrorism bulges out there.
"When one kind of attack becomes more difficult or expensive, terrorists substitute other, cheaper kinds," says Prof. Sandler.
Because terrorists allocate resources to maximize their return -- media coverage, political instability, a climate of fear -- they have multiple ways to achieve the same end. "Terrorists will always identify a weakest link and send out the team most likely to succeed," he adds.
The best move is not to protect targets. If you secure Disneyland, terrorists may go after Sea World. The effective strategy is to reduce terrorists' resources: Go after training camps and arms caches, choke off financing, infiltrate networks.
Game theory points out another trap for antiterrorism. If country A is at high risk of terrorism, it may tighten border controls and protect more targets. But because terrorism planned for country A might now be diverted to country B, B starts spending more on antiterrorism, too.
We now have a situation analogous to the Prisoner's Dilemma. If A thinks B is increasing deterrence, it must do so, too, or it will be the victim of terrorists diverting operations to A. If A thinks B is going easy on antiterrorism, it has even more reason to crack down: the more secure A is compared with B, the more likely that terrorists will target B and leave A alone. B, of course, makes the same rational calculation. As in the Prisoner's Dilemma, each country has an incentive not to get left behind.
"Countries spend more and more, but don't necessarily become more secure," says Prof. Sandler.
Game Theory also shows that acting rationally can give countries not in terrorists' sights an incentive to take a free ride on the coattails of those actively fighting terrorism. "This is a real concern for the U.S., which has deflected almost all attacks on its interests to foreign soil, where it has little influence," says Prof. Sandler. Witness Monday's bombing in Riyadh.
The Nash Equilibrium shows the most rational move isn't necessarily the one with the highest joint payoff. Applied to terrorism, the results of acting selfishly, albeit rationally, can be tragic.
Terrorists make rational decisions about the kind and timing of attacks, employing a substitution strategy. When U.S. airports installed metal detectors in 1973, for example, skyjackings fell to 16 a year from 70. But hostage-taking surged to 48 a year from 20, and assassinations to 36 a year from 20. Similarly, after U.S. embassies were fortified in 1976, attacks on American diplomatic targets fell to 20 a year from 28. But assassinations of diplomats and soldiers outside secured compounds rose to 53 a year from 20. Squeeze here, and terrorism bulges out there.
"When one kind of attack becomes more difficult or expensive, terrorists substitute other, cheaper kinds," says Prof. Sandler.
Because terrorists allocate resources to maximize their return -- media coverage, political instability, a climate of fear -- they have multiple ways to achieve the same end. "Terrorists will always identify a weakest link and send out the team most likely to succeed," he adds.
The best move is not to protect targets. If you secure Disneyland, terrorists may go after Sea World. The effective strategy is to reduce terrorists' resources: Go after training camps and arms caches, choke off financing, infiltrate networks.
Game theory points out another trap for antiterrorism. If country A is at high risk of terrorism, it may tighten border controls and protect more targets. But because terrorism planned for country A might now be diverted to country B, B starts spending more on antiterrorism, too.
We now have a situation analogous to the Prisoner's Dilemma. If A thinks B is increasing deterrence, it must do so, too, or it will be the victim of terrorists diverting operations to A. If A thinks B is going easy on antiterrorism, it has even more reason to crack down: the more secure A is compared with B, the more likely that terrorists will target B and leave A alone. B, of course, makes the same rational calculation. As in the Prisoner's Dilemma, each country has an incentive not to get left behind.
"Countries spend more and more, but don't necessarily become more secure," says Prof. Sandler.
Game Theory also shows that acting rationally can give countries not in terrorists' sights an incentive to take a free ride on the coattails of those actively fighting terrorism. "This is a real concern for the U.S., which has deflected almost all attacks on its interests to foreign soil, where it has little influence," says Prof. Sandler. Witness Monday's bombing in Riyadh.
The Nash Equilibrium shows the most rational move isn't necessarily the one with the highest joint payoff. Applied to terrorism, the results of acting selfishly, albeit rationally, can be tragic.
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